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ABSTRACT: The Basel II Capital Accord, established in 2007, provides guidelines for operational risk 
management, including requirements for a capital charge. The quantitative analysis for the capital charge 
requires inclusion of both quantitative and qualitative information, an implementation that has proven chal-
lenging for the banking industry. A contributing factor may be the interpretation and communication of risk 
and uncertainty, which are affected by the underlying risk perspective. Identified ambiguities in the Basel II 
Capital Accord indicate confusion regarding the underlying risk perspective, including uncertainty. Hence, 
raising the question of the underlying risk perspective and whether the Basel committee has consciously cho-
sen this risk perspective. Answers are found by analysing the required quantitative and qualitative input as well 
as method, in the context of risk perspectives and key elements; such as uncertainty, accuracy and validity. 
Establishing awareness and a fundamental understanding of risk perspectives may reduce ambiguities in the 
Basel II Capital Accord, thus increasing the potential for establishing sound operational risk management.
the single indicator of operational risk exposure, 
multiplying the average income over the last three 
years by a set ratio to calculate the capital charge. 
Using income as the only indicator of operational 
risk exposure does not necessarily generate a risk 
sensitive capital charge as reduced income may be 
a result of poor risk management rather than low 
risk exposure. However, the AMA allows banks to 
develop internal models subject to approval by the 
national financial supervisory authorities. Hence, 
the AMA is the relevant method for the discussion 
of frameworks for management of operational risk 
in the context of risk perspectives. In addition to 
internal and external data the AMA requires inclu-
sion of qualitative information in the quantitative 
risk analysis, represented by scenario analyses and 
Business Environment and Internal Control Factors 
[BEICFs] (BCBS 2011), an implementation that 
has proven challenging for the banking industry. 
For instance, rather than being used as an input to 
determine a bank’s risk exposure, BEICFs are often 
accounted for by making ex post adjustments to 
the output of the quantitative risk model (BCBS 
2011: 10). The way in which the guidelines on AMA 
are formulated may complicate the implementa-
tion of an AMA framework through ambiguities 
regarding underlying assumptions and methods. 
A review of the guidelines does for instance reveal 
1 InTRoDUCTIon
In 2007 the Basel II Capital Accord was imple-
mented, providing guidelines for, inter alia, opera-
tional risk management including a requirement 
for regulatory capital. operational risk, as defined 
by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
[BCBS] (2006: 144) is “the risk of loss resulting 
from inadequate or failed internal processes, people 
and systems or from external events”. Such events 
can e.g. be internal or external frauds or “fat fin-
ger” errors potentially leading to severe losses and 
possibly bankruptcy. The purpose of the guideline 
is to ensure that banks are able to withstand poten-
tially severe operational losses; attained by robust 
management of operational risk and a capital des-
ignated and calculated for the purpose of covering 
such potentially critical events.
According to BCBS (2011) the aim of the guide-
line is to establish a quantitative measure, reflecting 
the operational risk exposure, as well as promote 
management of operational risk. The quantita-
tive measure of operational risk can be established 
using three different approaches (BCBS 2006); the 
Basic Indicator Approach (BIA), The Standard-
ized Approach (TSA) and the Advanced Measure-
ment Approach (AMA), where AMA is the most 
comprehensive. The BIA and TSA use income as 
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contradicting statements regarding the underlying 
risk perspective. The guidelines contain formula-
tions indicating that the regulators may believe that, 
on the one hand, e.g. traditional statistical methods 
along with sufficient historical observations provide 
an accurate measure of operational risk with limited 
uncertainty. on the other hand, regulators empha-
size the importance of using scenario analyses and 
BEICFs, while at the same time implying that using 
such subjective measures generate more uncertainty. 
However, in a risk management context, the inter-
pretation of uncertainty is closely related to the 
underlying perspective on risk; and even though it is 
rarely debated in the operational risk literature there 
exist several different risk perspectives. The underly-
ing risk perspective impacts how uncertainty should 
be interpreted, described and communicated and 
can be related to several different factors, such as 
method, input, probability etc. For example; how 
should a risk analyst communicate e.g. loss event 
frequency and loss event severity assessments of 
operational risk to the board of directors in a way 
that they understand and are able to apply it in their 
decision making? When asked about uncertainties 
in presented risk figures, what does he/she answer? 
There are for instance risk perspectives where uncer-
tainty is subjectively expressed conditioned on the 
background knowledge the analyst has concerning 
the problem domain. Another risk perspective inter-
prets uncertainty as the gap between an estimated 
value and an assumed true value. The fundamental 
difference in perspectives has practical implications 
for the design of risk analysis methodologies.
A review of the Basel II Capital Accord has 
revealed inconsistencies in the way risk and elements 
of risk are discussed. The questions this paper aims 
to answer are; has the Basel committee consciously 
chosen their risk perspective and what perspective 
does the committee have on risk? Answering these 
questions is in the view of the authors essential to 
ensure successful development, implementation and 
communication of a framework for operational 
risk management. This paper provides an in depth 
account of different risk perspectives as basis for 
discussing the identified ambiguities in the Basel II 
guidelines and supporting documents.
Section 2 provides an overview of different risk 
perspectives and characteristics of operational 
risk. A discussion of the Basel II guidelines in the 
context of different risk perspectives is the focus in 
Section 3. Conclusive remarks and suggestions for 
improvement are provided in Section 4.
2 RISk pERSpECTIVES
Risk can be defined in many ways, and there is no 
broad consensus on a definition. Interested readers 
are referred to e.g. Aven & Renn (2009). In this 
paper risk is discussed in the context of two dif-
ferent perspectives. The purpose is to illustrate the 
importance of awareness concerning the underly-
ing risk perspective in the establishment and com-
munication of a framework for risk management 
to be implemented by banks. The first perspective 
and interpretation has its basis in traditional sta-
tistics where risk is defined using consequences 
and probabilities (C,P) (see e.g. kaplan 1991). In 
the second risk perspective risk is defined using 
consequences and associated uncertainties (C,U) 
(Aven & Renn 2009).
The first definition of risk (C,P) uses prob-
abilities to express the uncertainty related to con-
sequences of events. Here it is important to take 
into account that there are several interpretations 
of the probability concept. Basically there are two 
different ways of interpreting a probability (Aven 
2011);
a. As a relative frequency interpreted probabil-
ity (Pf)
b. As a subjective probability (P).
A relative frequency interpreted probability 
(Pf) is defined by the relative fraction of times an 
event occurs if  the analysed situation is “repeated” 
an infinite number of times, with reference to the 
Law of Large numbers. This approach falls under 
what we refer to as an objective probability set-
ting where the assessor seeks to estimate a “true”, 
unknown, value for the probability of some future 
event. Here, uncertainty means the gap between 
the estimated value and the supposed true value, 
and is commonly expressed through confidence 
intervals. The gap between the estimates and the 
“true” risk values could be large. Alternatively 
we can use subjective probabilities (also known as 
knowledge-based and judgmental probabilities) to 
express uncertainties, leading to a second-order 
probability interpretation (Aven 2011). In this case 
the assessor describes the uncertainties (degrees 
of beliefs) about what the true value of Pf is. The 
subjective probabilities are conditioned on some 
background information and knowledge. Hence, in 
the (C,P) risk perspective, risk can be described as 
(C,Pf*,U(Pf),K), where C is the consequences, Pf* is 
the estimated probability, U(Pf) is the uncertainty 
description of Pf and K is the background knowl-
edge that the estimated probability (Pf*) and the 
uncertainty description U is based on (Aven 2011). 
Applying this perspective, focus is on unobservable 
quantities, and adherent uncertainty.
The background knowledge that the second-
 order subjective probabilities (b) are based upon 
could be wrong or poor. Hence, in a (C,P) risk 
perspective, where such probabilities are used as a 
measure of uncertainty, the analyst could be misled 
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as this knowledge, and the strength of this knowl-
edge, is not a part of the risk description. However, 
adopting the second risk perspective; (C,U), the need 
to look beyond probabilities is acknowledged. In the 
(C,U) perspective risk is defined by consequences 
and uncertainties; “risk refers to uncertainty about 
and severity of the events and consequences (or 
outcomes) of an activity with respect to something 
that humans value” (Aven & Renn 2009: 6). Here it 
is acknowledged that the future is uncertain and the 
aim is to assess the uncertainty about underlying 
phenomena. According to this definition, risk is a 
two dimensional combination of (Aven 2011);
–	 Events and the consequences C
–	 Associated uncertainties U about events 
and C, including uncertainty about underlying 
phenomena influencing events and C.
The uncertainties are described based on 
some background knowledge, including expert 
knowledge. A risk description based on this under-
standing of risk takes the form (C,P,U1,K), where 
P refers to subjective probabilities, U1 represents 
aspects of uncertainties not captured by P and 
K is the background information and knowledge 
on which the assessed uncertainties are based. See 
Aven (2012) for an even more general formulation 
of this risk perspective.
The underlying risk perspective impacts the 
interpretation of uncertainty as well as how risk is 
understood and communicated. Basically; the two 
risk perspectives could be used for two different 
purposes (Aven 2011);
1. (C,P) when the objective is accurate risk 
estimation
2. (C,U) when the objective is uncertainty 
descriptions.
To obtain accurate estimation a large amount of 
relevant data must be available (empirical evidence). 
However, operational risk is “the risk of loss 
resulting from inadequate or failed internal proc-
esses, people and systems or from external events” 
(BCBS 2006: 144); a complex phenomenon, char-
acterized by complex causal interactions especially 
concerning rare events with potential high severity. 
Furthermore, the operational environment in a 
bank is characterized by non-stationarity caused 
by e.g. new products, new controls etc. Hence, 
to obtain a large amount of relevant data for the 
purpose of generating empirical evidence may 
be difficult. Given the characteristics of opera-
tional risk the assumption that such events can 
be repeated an infinite (a large) number of times 
under similar conditions is highly questionable. 
Adhering to the (C,P) risk perspective results are 
often evaluated in terms of accuracy, and the use 
of observational data is commonly associated with 
objective, or correct results. objectivity may how-
ever, be interpreted in different ways. When used in 
this paper the term objectivity is associated with an 
analysis of observed outcomes. Thus, objectivity 
implies the absence of subjectivity and judgment. 
Adopting the (C,P) perspective and attempting 
to assess operational losses using empirical evi-
dence, the non-stationary characteristics in the 
operational environment may not be reflected, 
resulting in a backwards-looking approach. The 
underlying assumptions of the (C,P) perspective 
may simply not be compatible with the charac-
teristics of the operational risk problem domain, 
and hence presenting the results derived under this 
interpretation as accurate may be questionable.
The (C,U) risk perspective is different, here the 
objective is to describe uncertainty, about events 
and consequences and influencing factors of 
events and consequences. Hence, adopting a (C,U) 
perspective increases the ability to reflect complex 
events dominating operational risk in banking.
Summarized; following the (C,P) risk perspective 
and adhering to the requirement of empirical data, 
can make it difficult to reflect the non-stationary 
characteristics of the operational environment in a 
bank. The (C,U) risk perspective, however, includes 
knowledge beyond past observations, acknowledg-
ing present uncertainties and the non-stationary 
characteristics of the operational environment. 
Hence, it allows for an improved ability to reflect 
the nature of the operational risks and predict the 
future operational risk profile. Communicating risk 
assessments derived from an in depth reflection of 
uncertainties related to e.g. business environment 
and internal control factors, increase the aware-
ness as well as understanding of the operational 
risk a bank is exposed to. Additionally, the (C,U) 
risk perspective improves the ability to identify key 
factors of risk and increase the ability to promote 
sound operational risk management.
3 RISk pERSpECTIVES In THE BASEL II 
GUIDELInES on opERATIonAL RISk
In the review process of the Basel II guidelines, and 
related documents, statements about key elements 
regarding risk perspectives are identified. The cho-
sen key elements that are discussed in the context 
of risk perspectives are uncertainty, accuracy and 
validity. The rationale for focusing on these three 
elements is their inherent bond to the underlying 
risk perspective. As described in the previous chap-
ter, uncertainty is fundamentally different from 
different risk perspectives. Furthermore, accu-
racy and validity also have strong dependency on 
the risk perspective as these terms are associated 
with the uncertainty concept. Thus, when using 
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a risk analysis in a practical context, awareness 
concerning the underlying risk perspective is very 
important. The chosen terms are also reviewed in 
the context of the four required input elements of 
the Basel II guidelines for AMA; internal data, 
external data, scenario analysis and BEICFs as 
well as the chosen or suggested analysis method. 
Depending on the underlying risk perspective, the 
development and implementation of a risk analy-
sis framework including necessary input may look 
very different. Hence, without a common and 
clear understanding of the applied risk perspec-
tive it may be challenging for banks to develop and 
implement an AMA model.
Basel II is a framework on, inter alia, operational 
risk, established by BCBS; a committee founded 
in 1975 by the central bank governors from ten 
countries, promoting the adoption of strong risk 
management practices (BCBS 2006). Another 
forum; the Committee of European Banking 
Supervisors (CEBS), provides guidelines reflect-
ing a common understanding among European 
supervisory authorities on the Basel II framework 
(CEBS 2006). on the 1st of January 2011 CEBS’ 
responsibilities and activities were taken over by 
the European Banking Authority (EBA). CEBS/
EBA has published a guideline on the implemen-
tation, validation and assessment of AMA, called 
GL10 (CEBS 2006).
In this section the Basel II framework, outlined 
in BCBS (2006) and BCBS (2011), as well as GL10 
(CEBS 2006) is analysed in the context of the two 
described risk perspectives. Where ambiguities are 
found these are discussed in terms of the potential 
consequences these may have for the development 
and communication of frameworks for opera-
tional risk management. Evaluating the identified 
set of unclear statements regarding the underlying 
risk perspective forms the basis for a conclusion 
regarding the underlying risk perspective of the 
Basel committee.
3.1 Operational risk management framework  
and measurement system
According to BCBS (2011: 11) “the Basel II 
framework requires banks to develop an opera-
tional Risk Management Framework” (oRMF); 
consisting of a bank’s:
–	 “Risk organisational and governance structure;
–	 policies, procedures and processes;
–	 Systems used by a bank in identifying, meas-
uring, monitoring, controlling and mitigating 
operational risk; and
–	 operational risk measurement system.”
The purpose of the operational Risk Measure-
ment System (oRMS) is to calculate an operational 
risk capital charge and should according to the 
Basel II guidelines be “closely integrated into the 
day-to-day risk management processes of the bank” 
(BCBS 2011: 11). Summarized; the oRMS should 
reflect the nature of the operational risk exposure 
of the particular bank being analysed (BCBS 2011). 
This includes reflection of, and responsiveness to 
changes in key operational risks, related drivers 
and internal controls, including changes in the 
internal and external environment. Additionally; 
the oRMS should be “credible, transparent, well-
documented and verifiable” (BCBS 2011: 12).
Extracted from the outlined points of the guide-
line (BCBS 2011) it can be said that the aim of the 
Basel II guideline is to:
–	 Establish a forward looking capital charge that 
reflects the exposure to operational risk of the 
particular bank, 
–	 promote sound management of operational 
risk. 
Furthermore, BCBS (2011: 28) states that “The 
building of a proper calculation dataset from avail-
able internal/external data is critical to the quanti-
fication of a bank’s operational risk capital charge 
and for accurately representing its operational 
risk profile.” Additionally, the verification should 
assure that “oRMF inputs and outputs are accu-
rate, complete, credible, relevant, authorised and 
accessible” (BCBS 2011: 14). In a supplementary 
guideline to the GL10 CEBS (2010: 1) acknowl-
edges that “one of the biggest challenges (…) is 
the establishment of an operational risk frame-
work which, on the one hand, is able to improve 
the way operational risks are identified, controlled 
and mitigated and, on the other hand, correctly 
reflects the level of operational risk an institution 
is exposed to.”
BCBS reveals that internal and external data 
(past observations) has the main focus in the quan-
tification of the capital charge as well as accurately 
reflecting the operational risk exposure. However, 
in order to provide an accurate measure of oper-
ational risk it must be clear what the accuracy is 
measured against. An accurate operational risk 
profile is a challenging condition to satisfy, and any 
claim of accuracy requires validation. To validate 
an accurately reflected operational risk profile may, 
for instance, require reconciliation between the 
identified/predicted risk picture and an actual risk 
picture (observed events). Hence, such a method is 
not coherent with a forward-looking approach and 
may not promote proactive risk management.
The problem seems to be that the Basel II 
guidelines’ focus is on accuracy where input and 
output are based on what happened in the past 
and seems to follow the (C,P) perspective on 
risk. If  the Basel II guidelines adopted the (C,U) 
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risk perspective the guidelines would expressively 
focus on accounting for the present uncertain-
ties when assessing possible future operational 
losses. Supporting the (C,U) perspective the guide-
lines could have differentiated between input that 
makes sense to be evaluated according to accuracy 
(e.g. past observations), and input that should not 
be evaluated according to accuracy (e.g. new prod-
ucts or new controls which affects past observa-
tions’ future predictability). Hence, adhering to the 
(C,U) perspective, valuable information is not left 
out of the analysis because it is not accurate.
3.2 Input in the analysis and method
BCBS (2011: 10) states that “A bank should care-
fully consider how the data elements are combined 
and used to ensure that the bank’s level of opera-
tional risk capital is commensurate with the level of 
risk to which it is exposed.” In GL10 CEBS (2006: 
120) argues that it should be ensured that the data 
holds “good enough quality”. Furthermore; banks 
should “demonstrate that they achieve high stand-
ards in terms of comprehensiveness, appropriate-
ness and accuracy of the data collected above the 
thresholds set” (CEBS 2006: 120). Additionally; 
CEBS (2006: 123) states that institutions using 
qualitative data as input should provide “sufficient 
evidence that the qualitative data are relevant to 
the intended risk objectives” and that everything 
possible is done to “remove biases”. Furthermore, 
GL10 suggests monitoring the evolution of the cor-
relation between qualitative data and observations 
over time. Additionally, CEBS (2006: 133) argues 
that “Institutions should ensure that information 
that is fed into the risk measurement systems is as 
accurate and complete as reasonably practicable.”
In order to say something about accuracy and 
good enough quality, it is necessary to consider the 
context in which these aspects are assessed. The 
Basel II guidelines and GL10 poorly determine 
what data, and in which context the data should 
comply with these objectives. From a (C,P) risk 
perspective it may be reasonable to assume that 
“everything” should be accurate. However, adopt-
ing a (C,U) risk perspective, accuracy may only be 
relevant for a small fraction of the input elements 
in the AMA; such as internal loss data. As argued 
in the previous section; accuracy may not be 
applicable for all elements required for the AMA. 
Hence, it should not be stated as a requirement in 
the Basel II guideline because it may result in valu-
able information and knowledge being left out of 
the operational risk analysis.
Focusing exclusively on monitoring the evolu-
tion of the model prediction and the observations 
may promote a reactive approach for analys-
ing operational risk. Such an approach may not 
generate forward-looking predictions, and does not 
acknowledge the non-stationary characteristics of 
the operational environment as well as the present 
uncertainties, indicating the (C,P) risk perspective 
in GL10. Additionally, it may produce predictions 
(estimates) based on some factors that are not 
relevant for the future operational environment. 
observations from the past cannot alone form 
the basis for producing predictions relevant for 
the future. Hence, adhering to a (C,P) perspec-
tive we are not using the best available knowledge 
for assessing future losses, negatively affecting the 
credibility of the analysis. Adhering to a (C,P) risk 
perspective the results may indicate a high degree 
of accuracy, but this requires the availability of a 
sufficient number of relevant observations, which 
regarding high severity events (with high impact 
on resulting capital) is difficult to obtain.
There is a tendency in the Basel II guidelines 
(BCBS) and GL10 (CEBS/EBA) to promote 
sufficient evidence, which often results in predic-
tions of operational risk exposure being derived 
from past observations, and scenarios developed 
from these data. Additionally; sufficient evidence 
may generate the impression that the estimated 
exposure of operational risk is accurate and com-
plete, resulting in objective estimates. However, 
when only some of the available knowledge is 
used, due to this “restriction”, the operational 
risk picture is not complete, and claims of accu-
rate risk estimates may be questionable. In order 
to approach accurate and complete information, 
all available knowledge should be used. If  (C,U) 
was the underlying perspective, some key words, as 
basis for the input in the AMA model, could e.g. 
be knowledge-based, communicating uncertainties 
and credibility.
It is interesting that BCBS stresses that a combi-
nation of data elements is necessary when analys-
ing operational risk. Several statements shows that 
the contents in some parts of the Basel II guide-
lines and supporting documents may be coher-
ent with the (C,U) risk perspective. However, the 
majority of paragraphs addressing elements that 
can be associated with the underlying risk perspec-
tive (such as e.g. accuracy) indicates that the (C,P) 
risk perspective is applied.
3.2.1 Internal loss data
Internal loss data are expected to “assist in the 
estimation of loss frequency”, “inform the severity 
distribution(s)” and “serve as input into scenario 
analyses” (BCBS 2011: 9). Furthermore, BCBS 
(2006: 152) argues that “The tracking of internal 
loss event data is an essential prerequisite to the 
development and functioning of a credible opera-
tional risk measurement system. Internal loss data 
is crucial for tying a bank’s risk estimates to its 
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actual loss experience.” In order to “generate reli-
able operational risk measures” for low-frequency 
events CEBS (2006: 128) suggests collecting histor-
ical observations for more than five years for the 
purpose of ensuring sufficient data. Additionally, 
CEBS (2006: 128) states that “in the absence of 
sufficient data, institutions should make conserva-
tive risk estimates”. In the same context, scenario 
generated data are mentioned for constructing 
data for operational losses.
The purpose of the operational risk capital 
charge is to make sure that banks are able to with-
stand the occurrence of high severity events. Internal 
loss data, however, only reflects what has happened 
in the past, and does not necessarily reveal future 
high severity events. The stressed complexity related 
to low-frequency operational loss events, and the 
evolutionary state of the banking industry affects 
the relevance of historical observations potentially 
making such events less relevant. non-stationary 
characteristics of the operational environment 
may result in severe events not reoccurring. Hence, 
increasing the required period of collecting internal 
data may be necessary for enabling statistical analy-
sis under which requirements for accuracy are met, 
but at the cost of data relevance.
Risk estimates may refer to an analyst seeking 
to find a measure that is close to an assumed, true 
value, derived from the relative frequency probabil-
ity interpretation, which falls under the (C,P) risk 
perspective.
3.2.2 External data
External data are to be “used in estimation of 
severity distributions” because it “contains valu-
able information to inform the tail of the loss 
distribution(s)” and it is also “essential input into 
scenario analysis” (BCBS 2011: 9). Furthermore, 
BCBS (2006: 153) states that the bank must use 
external data in the oRMS “… especially when 
there is reason to believe that the bank is exposed 
to infrequent, yet potentially severe, losses.” GL10 
argues that external data can be an appropriate 
“source for capital calculation purposes, particu-
larly when institutions have limited internal loss 
data, e.g. on new businesses” (CEBS 2006: 126). 
Furthermore, GL10 also promotes public sources 
of external data for finding additional informa-
tion, e.g. about “severe tail events, especially on 
their causes” (CEBS 2006: 126).
An essential question to ask is why (or how to 
justify that) a bank is not exposed to infrequent, 
severe losses? This highlights the lack of awareness 
of the present uncertainties, revealing a perspective 
on risk coherent with the (C,P) risk perspective. 
one cannot know for certain that a bank is not 
exposed to infrequent severe losses. In a (C,U) 
risk perspective one would carefully consider why 
infrequent, potentially severe, losses should not be 
included in the analysis.
In GL10 CEBS/EBA suggest the use of external 
data for the purpose of finding additional informa-
tion about causes. The focus on causes indicates a 
possibility for a risk perspective more coherent with 
the (C,U) perspective, where causes are essential.
3.2.3 Scenario analyses
According to BCBS (2011: 9) scenario analy-
ses should be “a part of  the oRMF” and serve 
as “input into the AMA model”. Furthermore, 
BCBS (2006: 154) also states that “A bank must 
use scenario analysis of  expert opinion in conjunc-
tion with external data to evaluate its exposure to 
high-severity events. This approach draws on the 
knowledge of experienced business managers and 
risk management experts to derive reasoned assess-
ments of  plausible severe losses. For instance, 
these expert assessments could be expressed as 
parameters of  an assumed statistical loss dis-
tribution.” Additionally, the Basel II guideline 
“acknowledges that the scenario process is quali-
tative and that the output from a scenario process 
necessarily contains significant uncertainties. This 
uncertainty, together with the uncertainty from 
the other elements, should be reflected in the out-
put of  the model producing a range for the capital 
estimate. The Committee recognises that quanti-
fying the uncertainty arising from scenario biases 
poses significant challenge and is an area requiring 
further research” (BCBS 2011: 9). It is also stated 
that scenarios should be “designed to reduce pos-
sible subjectivity and biases as much as possible” 
and the scenarios’ assumptions “should be based 
as much as possible on empirical evidence” (CEBS 
2006: 126).
BCBS’ statements about scenario analyses 
provide a good illustration of the ambiguities 
regarding the underlying risk perspective adhered 
to under the Basel II guidelines. on the one side, 
BCBS enhance the inclusion of expert opinion and 
reasoned assessments of plausible severe losses, 
which could be appropriate and expected under the 
(C,U) risk perspective. However, on the other side, 
the last part of BCBS’ quote on expert assessments 
could be expressed as parameters of an assumed 
statistical loss distribution may indicate application 
of the (C,P) risk perspective as the assessment is 
then comparable to that of a data analysis. In a 
(C,P) risk perspective the expert assessment may 
be assigned on an overall, general level, e.g. expert 
assessment may be used to assess the exposure to 
an event directly. However, an expert is much more 
likely to give a well-reasoned assessment on causes 
of events, rather than on the event itself, especially 
when dealing with complex events. Adopting a 
(C,U) risk perspective, the expert assessment would 
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be assigned on a much more detailed level. Hence, 
at such a level it could be argued that the expert 
is more likely to handle problems associated with 
biases, and hence provide credible assessments on 
whether causes are present or not.
Furthermore, BCBS reveals the adoption of the 
(C,P) risk perspective, when stating that the model 
should produce a range for the capital estimate to 
reflect the uncertainty. Such a statement does not 
make sense under the (C,U) risk perspective as 
the analysis’ results under this perspective is an 
expression of uncertainty. Hence, this quote from 
BCBS may suggest that uncertainty is not present 
or reduced if  scenario analyses are not used; i.e. 
if  the analyses are carried out using solely internal 
and external data as input. However, past obser-
vations given in the form of internal and external 
data points will not reflect changes in the opera-
tional environment (e.g. new/improved controls or 
products) in the future prediction. A range for the 
capital estimate may aid in reflecting uncertainties 
in the scenario analysis, but the implication that 
such uncertainty is not present when using histori-
cal observations is questionable. Hence, if  a range 
for the capital estimate should be used to reflect 
uncertainties when carrying out scenario analyses, 
there is no reason why the same approach should 
not apply when using historical observations. 
I.e. predicting the future using past observations 
includes more uncertainty than acknowledged 
in the Basel II guidelines, because the basis for 
producing a range for the capital estimate is not suf-
ficiently comprehensive.
GL10 (CEBS/EBA) also indicates a (C,P) risk 
perspective when stating that assumptions in sce-
narios should be founded on empirical evidence 
(CEBS 2006). While the intention to ensure that 
assumptions are valid is sound, requiring empirical 
evidence may exclude valid arguments and relevant 
input from the analysis. In order to base anything 
on empirical evidence, observations must be com-
pared (tested) to the predictions made with e.g. a 
model. However, by the time it is proved empiri-
cally, the non-stationary characteristics of the 
operational environment may already have affected 
the future relevance of observations. If  a (C,U) 
perspective was adopted, all (relevant) knowledge, 
including experts, would be the basis for decisions 
regarding scenarios for the purpose of not exclud-
ing relevant factors of the operational risk profile.
3.2.4 BEICFs
BCBS (2006) focuses on the need to capture the key 
BEICFs for the purpose of being more forward-
looking and reflecting the controls and operat-
ing environment of a bank, as well as identifying 
improving and deteriorating actions. Furthermore, 
BCBS (2006: 154) states that BEICFs “needs to 
be justified (…) based on experience and involv-
ing the expert judgment of the affected business 
areas”. Additionally, according to BCBS (2011: 9) 
“Incorporating BEICFs directly into the capital 
model poses challenges given the subjectivity and 
structure of BEICF tools. The Committee has 
observed that BEICFs are widely used as an indi-
rect input into the quantification framework and 
as an ex post adjustment to model output.” In 
GL10 CEBS (2006: 127) expresses that “it might 
not be possible to justify the appropriateness of 
the sensitivity of risk estimates because of a lack 
of empirical evidence on the relationship between 
the BE&ICFs and the operational risk exposure” 
when oRMS is implemented for the first time. In 
the same context CEBS (2006: 127) states that the 
implementation methods “should at least be quali-
tatively justified”. GL10 also promotes incorpo-
rating key BEICFs that significantly influences the 
operational risk profile; that is “forward-looking 
and closely aligned with the quality of the institu-
tion’s control and operating environment” (CEBS 
2006: 127).
The statement about subjectivity and structure 
of  the BEICF tools and that BEICFs are usu-
ally included by ex post adjustments may reveal 
that the guidelines are based on the (C,P) risk 
perspective. In a (C,U) risk perspective BEICFs 
would be given a higher priority because BEICFs 
often describe root causes of loss events and fail-
ures in control activities, used to prevent and miti-
gate losses (Andersen et al. 2013). Hence, BEICFs 
are a fundamental part of the foundation for 
assessing a bank’s risk exposure, and should be 
included throughout the analysis rather than as 
an add-on (Andersen et al. 2013). The practice of 
carrying out ex post adjustment of BEICFs might 
be a consequence of what seems to be understood 
as the most accurate way of quantifying future 
losses; using objective (empirical) data, coherent 
with a (C,P) risk perspective. However, BEICFs 
can be included at an earlier stage, at the same level 
as internal and external loss data. As a result; loss 
event frequency and loss event severity assessments 
can be based on more information and knowledge. 
Hence, reflecting a more comprehensive and cred-
ible exposure to operational risk, adopting a (C,U) 
risk perspective.
Additionally, the statement from BCBS about 
experience may be interpreted in different ways; 
one interpretation is an analyst’s or an expert’s 
specific and extensive experience within the ana-
lysed object, and hence valuable input into the 
analysis. Another interpretation of experience is 
to justify BEICFs upon experienced loss events, 
i.e. past observations (empirical evidence). The 
first interpretation is consistent with the (C,U) risk 
perspective. However, taking into consideration 
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previously reviewed statements it appears more 
likely that CEBS/EBA interpret BCBS’ experience 
as empirical evidence.
Furthermore, GL10 reveals a lack of consist-
ency concerning risk perspectives, by stating that 
BEICFs should be forward-looking, indicating a 
(C,U) risk perspective. Forward-looking BEICFs 
may acknowledge and reflect factors about the 
future that may not be revealed in past experience. 
Hence, the objectives of forward-looking and 
empirical evidence can be difficult to align.
3.2.5 Method
For AMA models BCBS (2011: 7) promotes 
“flexibility” and desires “to explore how best to 
obtain risk sensitive estimates of operational risk 
exposure.” Furthermore, “These differences in 
modeling approaches, whether reflected in different 
correlation estimates, distributional assumptions, 
or other critical features of the model, clearly affect 
the AMA methodology of individual banks and, 
ultimately, the amount of capital resulting from 
the application of the AMA” (BCBS 2011: 7). one 
of the general criteria suggested by CEBS (2006: 
122) for the AMA models is “The model should 
be robust in the sense that it includes all significant 
drivers of the institution’s operational risk profile 
and it should be sensitive to material changes in the 
institution’s operational risk profile.” Furthermore, 
GL10 promotes the development of a model that 
is credible and justifiable and promotes evaluation 
of “the accuracy of the operational risk capital fig-
ures” (CEBS 2006: 128).
BCBS’ first quote signalize a flexible framework 
coherent with the (C,U) perspective. However, the 
examples in the next quote; “different correlation 
estimates, distributional assumptions, or other 
critical features of the model” as well as “clearly 
affect (…) the amount of capital resulting from 
the application of the AMA” (BCBS 2011: 7), pro-
vides examples of terminology that could indicate 
an underlying (C,P) perspective. If  (C,U) were the 
underlying perspective, predictions instead of esti-
mates would be used, and uncertainties of opera-
tional risk management would be emphasized. 
CEBS/EBA implies that (C,U) is the underlying 
risk perspective; stressing inclusion of significant 
drivers and that the model should be sensitive to 
material changes and as stable as possible; which 
can be interpreted as the model generating reli-
able predictions. Accuracy, however, as already 
stressed, is a challenging condition to satisfy, and 
implies the (C,P) perspective. If  accuracy should 
be assured, by e.g. empirical evidence as suggested 
in other parts of the Basel II guidelines (BCBS) or 
GL10 (CEBS/EBA), it would generate backwards-
looking predictions and significant drivers would 
be left out when analysing future loss events.
4 ConCLUSIon
The Basel II guidelines’ requirement on inclusion 
of internal and external data, scenario analyses and 
BEICFs suggesting that decisions and measures 
should be based on all the available knowledge, not 
only historical data, could be considered to con-
form with the (C,U) perspective. It is apparent from 
the input requirements stated in the Basel II guide-
lines that the BCBS is aware of the non-stationary 
characteristics of the operational environment. 
However, difficulties arise when the credibility 
of the analysis is assessed in terms of accuracy, 
where subjective input is considered to increase 
uncertainty, clearly indicating a (C,P) perspective 
on risk. Following the (C,U) perspective of risk, 
one would acknowledge the uncertainty associated 
with the appropriateness of past observations for 
the prediction of future losses. Hence, the purpose 
is to increase the credibility and ability to handle 
quantitative consequences of high severity events, 
while generating decision support. Additionally, if  
the (C,U) risk perspective was adopted, prediction 
rather than estimation could be a better word to 
use considering that all four input elements should 
be used in order to generate reliable predictions of 
the exposure to operational risk.
Hence, the analysis does not indicate a con-
sciously chosen risk perspective, but it reveals an 
underlying (C,P) perspective in large parts of the 
Basel II guidelines. GL10 does reveal some cor-
relations as well as ambiguities with the Basel II 
guidelines, when it comes to risk perspectives. 
Considering the identified ambiguities in the risk 
communication in the Basel II guidelines it is not 
surprising that the industry is struggling with the 
development of risk measurement frameworks 
that fully comply with the guidelines.
operational risk is a complex phenomenon, 
and events reflected in past observations, are 
not necessarily relevant for events occurring in 
the future. Hence, past observations and empiri-
cal evidence may not be the appropriate way of 
ensuring the reflection of  the operational risk 
profile. By including all (relevant) knowledge in 
the analysis of  operational risk the basis for the 
prediction of  future losses is more comprehensive, 
improving the ability to reflect an evolving opera-
tional environment. Including BEICFs at an ear-
lier stage, as suggested by Andersen et al. (2013), 
improves the abilities of  reflecting such changes. 
Hence, the “reality” addressed when adopting 
a (C,P) risk perspective, an approach based on 
observations and empirical evidence, is another 
“reality” than when the (C,U) perspective and 
a knowledge-based approach is adopted. More 
(relevant) knowledge in addition to internal and 
external data is favourable, and could generate a 
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“model reality” that better reflects the nature of 
operational risk.
It may be argued that how the assessor define 
risk is not so important for actual risk assessment 
or risk management, as long as the assessor is pre-
cise on what is described and the terminology is 
consistent and includes awareness on the adopted 
perspective’s limitations. However, in conformity 
with Aven (2012), this paper’s authors argue that 
the underlying risk perspective strongly influences 
how risk is analysed, and seriously affects the 
risk management and decision making. Hence, it 
may be in the interest of BCBS, operational risk 
managers in banking, as well as other stakehold-
ers (including clients), to increase the awareness of 
risk perspectives in the continued work with devel-
oping risk management standards for the banking 
industry.
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